University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1970

The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition" (1970). Minnesota Law Review. 2992.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2992

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

1139

Notes
The Constitutionality of Nonresident Tuition
I. INTRODUCTION
One of our society's proudest accomplishments has been to
make higher education available to nearly all academically qualified students. Every state has at least one public college or unversity, and tuition at these publically supported colleges and
universities is low enough for almost anyone to afford.
Society has put higher education within the financial reach
of the average student, but there is one string attached. The
student must be willing to attend college in his own home state.
If he wishes to go to college in another state, the cost may be prohibitive, even at a public college. In all fifty states nonresidents
must pay more tuition than residents to attend state supported
colleges and universities.1 In all cases, nonresident tuition is
2
substantially greater than resident tuition.
Since nonresident tuition is administered by state supported
colleges and universities, it must be administered within constitutional limits. There are three contexts in which nonresident
tuition causes constitutional difficulties. First, the basic notion
that it is constitutionally permissible to distinguish between residents and nonresidents is not beyond question. Second, the waiting-period requirement that the student not only be domiciled in
the state on the date of registration but also be so domiciled for
one year prior to that date, poses additional difficulties. Finally, the standards by which a university determines when a
student has become a resident while attending school must also
be constitutionally formulated. In this Note each of these problems will be considered in turn in light of the evolving constitutional requirements.

II. MECHANICS OF NONRESIDENT TUITION
The mechanics for administration of nonresident tuition are
sinple and relatively standard. The state first must decide who
I.

See AivIcAI CoUncn ON EDUCATEON, Am=CAx

Um~vnirsI~s

83 et seq (11th ed. 0. Singletary ed. 1968). See also N.Y.
Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 32, col. 1.
2. For example, according to 1968 figures, nonresident tuition at
the Umversity of Vermont was $1800 per year, compared to $600 for
residents. AzmscAN CouiciL ON EDUCATION, supranote 1, at 1547.
AND CoLLEGES
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will be classified as a "resident student" and who will be classified as a "nonresident student." The definitions of these categories, as well as other administrative rules concerning residence,
are usually contained in the residence regulations of individual
universities, although in some states the residence rules are statutory."
The "residence" required of a resident student obviously
must be something more than mere temporary presence in the
state, since every student would meet that requirement. The test
which is most commonly adopted is "domicile." 4 To be a "resident student," one must be domiciled in the state. The meaning
of "domicile" varies depending on the purpose for which the concept is used, but it may be broadly defined as the place which
one considers to be his home.5
In general, two things are required in order to establish
domicile in a state: (1) actual presence in the state and (2) the
intention to remain, or at least a lack of intention to establish a
home elsewhere.( Because the individual's intentions are a crucial factor in domicile questions, there can be no absolute criteria by which to determine where a person actually is domiciled,
and each case depends largely on its particular facts or circum7

stances.

In addition to the domicile requirement, most states also impose a waiting-period on new residents, i.e., no person is entitled
to resident tuition status unless he has been continuously domiciled in the state for a given period of time, usually one year.
Because of the waiting-period, a new resident of the state will be
3. See, e.g., University of Minnesota, Residence Regulations:

No student is eligible for residence classification unless he or, if
he is a minor, the person from whom he derives residence is a
bona fide domiciliary of this state and has lived in this state
substantially continuously for at least one year immediately
prior thereto.
Id. at 2a.
For statutory residence rules, see CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 23054-59,
(West 1966); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 244 (West 1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 124-18 (1963); Wis. STAT.ANN.§ 36.16 (1966).
4. The domicile requirement can be adopted either by writing the
residence rules in terms of domicile, or by interpreting "residence,"
when used in the rules, to mean domicile. See, e.g., Kirk v. Board of
Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 435, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 263 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970); Spencer, The Legal Aspects
of the Nonresident Tuition Fee, 6 ORE.L. REV. 332, 344 (1926).
5. See Spencer, supra note 4, at 337.
6. A. EHRmNZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLaCT OF LAWS 240-41
(1962); Spencer,supranote 4,at 338.
7. Spencer,supra note 4,at 354.
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forced to pay nonresident tuition if he attends school within a
year of his taking up residence in the state.8
I.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Before analyzing the issues raised by nonresident tuition, a
discussion of the theories on which such cases are based will be
helpful. Suits attacking nonresident tuition have usually been
based on a combination of (1) state and federal equal protection
clauses, (2) the article IV "privileges and immunities" clause and
(3) an asserted constitutional right to travel interstate.0

A.

EQUAL PROTECTioN CLAUSE

The traditional understanding of the equal protection clause
has been that it forbids a state to treat people differently unless
there is a substantial difference between them and the treatment
based on that difference is rationally related to a legitimate state
objective or purpose. 10 The underlying ideal is that similar cases
should be treated similarly, although courts have not required

legislative and administrative classifications to adhere to this
ideal with mathematical precision. 1 Traditionally, a classification was likely to be upheld unless it was palpably arbitrary; if
any state of facts which would sustain the classification could be
reasonably imagined, such facts would be assumed. 12
In some recent cases the Supreme Court has gone beyond
the traditional equal protection rule and applied a stricter standard. In cases where the difference in treatment is based on
"suspect" criteria such as race, lineage or alienage, or where the
classification penalizes or has a "chilling" effect on the exercise
of a fundamental constitutional right, it will not be enough
merely to show a rational basis for the classification. The Court
will strike down the classification unless it is found to further a
8.

See, e.g., Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 188 Cal. 559, 205

P. 1071 (1922).

9. See Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969); American

Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); Clarke v.
Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal.
Regents
Regents
10.

App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Bryan v.
of Univ. of Calif., 188 Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922); Landwehr v.
of Univ. of Colo., 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 122 (S.D. Iowa 1966).

11. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1083 (1969).
12. Id. See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
61, 78 (1911).
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"compelling state interest."'
The chilling effect of a statute
concerns the extent to which the statute influences people not
to exercise a constitutional right. To decide whether a statute
"penalizes" the exercise of a constitutional right, one must look to
the harm the statute imposes on a person who chooses to exercise his rights. 14 Not all statutes which treat unfavorably
those who have exercised constitutional rights involve penalties.
The Court has indicated that there is a level of severity which
must be exceeded before the unfavorable treatment can be
viewed as a penalty.' 5
The Court has never explained how it determines which
interests are entitled to the protection of the compelling interest
test.' 6 According to one commentator, two factors enter into the
Court's decision whether to invoke the compelling interest test:
(1) the relative invidiousness of the particular discrimination
and (2) the importance of the subject with respect to which
equality is sought. 17 The factors are interrelated, so that the
more invidious the discrimination, the less important the subject
need be, and vice versa.' 8
It is difficult to say what kind of state interests will satisfy
the compelling interest test. In cases applying the test, no state
interest has ever been found to be sufficiently compelling; 19 the
interest in national security during war time is the only interest
which has satisfied the compelling interest test. 20 When a fundamental interest is impaired, the state will have to show at least
that the classification is more than just one of several reasonable
13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969); United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 404 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
14. Obviously the "penalty" and "chilling effect" concepts are
closely related, since it is the prospect of the penalty which creates the
chilling effect. The Court often seems to view the two concepts as
interchangeable. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

15. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969); see also
Note, supra note 11, at 1130.
16. Note, supra note 11, at 130.
17. See Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Foreward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HAV. L.
REv. 91, 95 (1966).

18. See Note, supra note 11, at 1120.
19. Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989, 1004 (1969).
20. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Note, supra note 19, at
1004.
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ways of achieving its goal. 21
B. PvR=EGEs AND hwtfrIs

CLAUSE

The privileges and immunities clause states that
"[T]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."2 2 The clause does not cre-

ate any new rights between a state and its citizens. Instead it
concerns the extent to which the state must extend to nonresidents any rights and privileges which residents of the state enjoy.23 In the context of nonresident tuition, therefore, the privileges and immunities clause cannot be used to attack the waitingperiod requirement, because the waiting-period is imposed
against residents of the state.24 It is relevant, however, to the
basic resident-nonresident distinction.
The clause was originally interpreted to mean that a state
must grant citizens of other states who are within its jurisdic25
tion exactly the same rights as it granted its own citizens.
However, it is now settled that the privileges and immunities
clause is not absolute, and that a citizen of one state is not entitled to enjoy in another state every privilege which that state
gives its citizens.2
The leading modern case on the privileges and immunities
clause is Toomer v. Witsel, 27 which involved South Carolina's
statutes regulating commercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile
maritime belt off the coast of that state. The Supreme Court
held the statutes, which imposed a 25 dollar license fee on resident fishermen and a 2,500 dollar license fee on nonresident fishermen, unconstitutional. 28 The Court stated that the privileges
and immunities clause is not absolute, but that it did bar discrimination against citizens of other states where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other states.2 9 The inquiry in each case must
21. See Note, supra note 11, at 1122.
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
23. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873). Although the privileges and immunities clause speaks of "citizens," discrimination between "residents" and "nonresidents" is within its scope.
See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397 (1948).
24. Cf. Note, supra note 19, at 998-99.
25. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873);
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1968) (dicta).
26. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898).
27. 334 U.S.'385 (1948).
28. Id. at 403.
29. Id. at 396.
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be concerned with whether valid reasons for the discrimination
exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close rela30
tion to those reasons.
Thus, the requirements of the privileges and immunities
clause are similar to the traditional requirements of the equal
protection clause. The degree of discrimination in both cases
must be rationally related to a legitimate reason for discriminating. However, there is nothing similar in privileges and immunities law to the "compelling interest" standard which has evolved
in equal protection cases.
C.

RIGHT TO TRAVEL INTERSTATE

The courts have always recognized that the right to travel
between states is protected by the Constitution, but they have
had difficulty deciding what part of the Constitution protects
the right. 81 Unfortunately, the framers of the Constitution did
not include an express guarantee that "the people of each state
shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other State,"
32
as the Articles of Confederation had contained.
The right to travel has been the subject of a long series of
Supreme Court cases. The Court first dealt with the right to
travel in 1849 in the Passenger Cases,3 3 in which New York and
Massachusetts statutes imposing taxes on alien passengers arriving in the ports of those states were declared unconstitutional.
In an oft-quoted passage from his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Taney said:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government
was formed, we are one people, with one common country.
We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the
same community must have the right to pass and repass
through every part
of it without interruption, as freely as in
34
our own States.

In Paul v. Virginia3 5 the Court noted the important role of
the article IV privileges and immunities clause in making the
citizens of the United States one people. The Court said that
among other things the clause gives the citizens of each state the
right to free ingress into other states and egress from them. 30
30.

Id.

31. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 and accompanying text (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757-59 (1966);
Note, supra note 19, at 990.
32.
33.

ARTICLES OF CONEmDERATION, article IV.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).

34.
35.
36.

Id. at 492.
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
Id. at 180 (dictum).
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In Crandallv. Nevada 7 the Court struck down a state tax of
one dollar per person on passengers leaving the state on railroads,
stage coaches and other such vehicles. The Court reasoned that
citizens have the right to go to the seat of the federal government
in Washington and to various federal offices throughout the
country, and that the state may not use its taxing power to impede the exercise of that right.38 The Court did not cite any specific clause in the Constitution as the source of the right to
travel.
The commerce clause and the fifth amendment's due process clause have also been used to support the right to travel.
In Edwards v. California 9 the Court held that a California statute making it a crime for anyone to bring a nonresident indigent
into the state was invalid because it imposed an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce.4 0 The Court declared,
"[No] single state [may attempt] to isolate itself from difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of per4 1 In Kent v. Dulles, 42
sons and property across its borders."
which concerned the Secretary of State's refusal to issue passports to certain communists, the Court held that the right to
travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be de43
prived without due process of law under the fifth amendment.
Recent cases on the right to travel have emphasized simply
that the right exists, and have not sought to tie the right to a particular constitutional provision.44 In Shapiro v. Thompson,4 5 the
leading recent case, the Court recognized the right to travel as a
fundamental constitutional right, so that legislative classifications which touched on the right had to be justified by a compelling state interest.4
The Court held that statutes limiting
welfare benefits to those who had been residents of the state for
one year were unconstitutional because they penalized the exercise of the right to travel and did not advance any compelling
state interest.
37. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
38. Id. at 44-45.
39. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
40. Id. at 177.
41. Id. at 173.
42. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
43. Id. at 125; accord, Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,
505 (1964).
44. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 (1966); Note, supra note 19, at 996-97.
45. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
46. Id. at 638.
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Aside from the problem of finding a basis in the Constitution
for the right to travel, difficult questions exist concerning the
scope of that right.4 7 It is apparent from the cases that this right
has been judicially expanded over the years. The early cases,
i.e., the Passenger Cases48 and Crandall,49 struck down statutes
which directly burdened travel itself.5 0 Edwards v. California1
was the first case to protect the interstate traveler from indirect burdens. 52 However, in Edwards it was still only the interest in physical movement which was protected. This final
limitation was removed in Shapiro v. Thompson, 8 where the
Court for the first time ruled that the right to travel protects
to govnot only physical movement but also the right of persons
5 4
ernment benefits in the states to which they migrate.
Shapiro marks the broadest extension of the right to travel,
but even that case does not say that the right to travel is the
right to be completely free of discouragement of interstate movement. The Court chose not to adopt the theory that since the
right to travel is an independent constitutional right, any state
statute which burdens the right is invalid under the fourteenth
amendment. 58 Instead the Court indicated that a balancing approach will be used in right to travel cases. The state may still
make classifications which burden the right to travel, provided
the classifications advance a compelling state interest. 0 The
Court said that all citizens have the right to travel "uninhibited
by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement." 57 Finally, the Court's statement that
47. See Note, supra note 19, at 992.
48.
49.

48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).

51.

314 U.S. 160 (1941).

50. In Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900), an indirect tax was
held not to conflict with the right to travel. The Court upheld a
Georgia tax imposed on agents engaged in hiring laborers in Georgia
to be employed beyond the limits of the state and said that the tax
only incidentally and remotely affected freedom of egress from the
state. Id. at 274-75.
52. Edwards involved an indirect burden because the statute struck
down in that case punished the person who brought an indigent nonresident into the state, not the indigent himself. See Harvith, The
Constitutonality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs,54 CALIF. L. REv. 567, 615 (1966).
53. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
54. See Note,supra note 19, at 998.
55. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).

56. Id. at 638.
57. Id.at 629 (emphasis added).
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waiting-periods for other governmental benefits may be valid
either because they promote compelling interests or do not penalize the right to travel implies a balancing of conflicting interests.58
IV. CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF NONRESIDENT
TUITION
A. THE REsmiNT-NoN~smENT CLAssincATIox
1. Higher Tuition for Nonresidents
Where the resident-nonresident tuition classification has
been attacked on constitutional grounds, the courts have always
upheld the state's right to charge nonresidents higher tuition
than residents.5 9 The cases have justified higher tuition for nonresidents primarily on the ground that residents (or their parents) pay taxes to the state to support the state university, while
nonresidents and their families do not make similar payments.
The additional tuition charged nonresidents, therefore, is held
reasonable because it tends to distribute the cost of operating and
supporting the university more evenly between residents and
nonresidents attending the university.6 0
The classification is not usually based on the disparity of tax
contribution while the student is attending the university,0 1 because during the time when a nonresident is living in the state as
a student, he pays the same taxes as a resident and makes other
economic contributions, such as spending money in the local community and possibly being employed there.02 Instead the classification is based on the assumption that a resident has either supported the university in the past through taxes or will pay state
58. See id. at 638 n.21.
59. See Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878 (8th Cir. 1969); American
Commuters Ass'n v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); Clarke v.
Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.. Iowai 1966); Kirk v. Board of Regents,
273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Landwehr
v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451 (1964).
60. See Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1969); Clarke
v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Kirk v. Board of
Regents, 273 CaL App. 2d 430, 443-44, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist. Ct.
App. .1969).
61. However, nonresident tuition in Missouri seems to be based
at least in part on the failure of the nonresident to make a tax contribution while he is attending school since UNrvsnsr oF"MIssount Tu=ON Am RESmENCE Ruim § 10.1703 allows a nonresident student to offset against his tuition any income tax that he pays to the state of MissourL

62. Cf. Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal

Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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taxes in the future, whereas a nonresident will not.0 s
The tax contribution explanation for the resident-nonresident distinction is not completely satisfactory. Its basic flaw is
that while the distinction is based on tax contribution, the classification is made between residents and nonresidents. Between
these two aspects of nonresident tuition policy lies an assumption
that residents have made or will make a substantially greater
tax contribution than nonresidents. This is not always the case.
For example, if a family has lived and paid taxes in a state for 15
years it has certainly made a substantial tax contribution to the
state. If that family then moves to another state it would still
be reasonable and constitutionally permissible to give members
of the family resident tuition status for a limited number of years
in their old state.
Since both the privileges and immunities clause and the equal
protection clause allow the state to distinguish between residents
and nonresidents on the basis of their tax contribution,0 4 distinguishing among nonresidents on the basis of tax contribution
would also seem to be permissible. Therefore, there would not
be any constitutional prohibition against allowing some nonresidents (who had previously made a substantial tax contribution
to the state) to pay resident tuition. On the other hand, while it
is permisssible, such a policy is not constitutionally required.
The state might be so required if cost equalization were the
only reason for imposing additional tuition on nonresidents.05
There are, however, other possible reasons for charging nonresidents additional tuition. The state could reasonably argue
that since its educational facilities are limited, and since residents are more likely than nonresidents to remain in the state
after graduation, and thus give the state a return on its educational investment, the state may favor residents over nonresi63. See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 n.6 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
64. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. Cf. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Shapiro said that a state could not
apportion state services among its citizens on the basis of their past tax
contributions. Id. at 632-33. It did not say that the state could not
apportion services between citizens and noncitizens, i.e., residents and
nonresidents, on the basis of their tax contributions.
65. If cost equalization were the only purpose for nonresident
tuition, requiring a former resident to pay nonresident tuition could be a
denial of equal protection. It would be arbitrary to make a student pay
nonresident tuition simply because his tax contribution occurred prior
to his period of attendance rather than during that time or afterwards.
Cf. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection 82 HARv. L. Rav.
1065, 1079 (1969).
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dents when allocating its limited educational facilities. ° Higher
tuition for nonresidents could be viewed as a reasonable way of
favoring residents. Under this rationale, a nonresident's previous
residence in the state would be irrelevant. As a nonresident he
would be less likely than a resident to use his education in the
state. Therefore, to discourage his attendance, he could be charged nonresident tuition.
In addition, since the interests of nonresidents are not
strongly represented in state legislatures, where nonresident tuition policy is made, it is unlikely that many nonresidents will be
allowed resident tuition status. However, some attempts have
been made to extend resident tuition status to nonresidents who
have made a substantial contribution to the state's economy and
67
welfare.
In upholding nonresident tuition the courts have found it
enough to say that nonresident tuition involves a reasonable
classification and is rationally related to the legitimate state object of financing the state university.6 8 Nonresident tuition has
never been scrutinized under the "compelling interest" standard
used in some equal protection cases. 69 Nonresident tuition would
have to be judged under that standard if it were found to chill or
to penalize the right to travel interstate.
Undoubtedly nonresident tuition discourages some students
from traveling to other states to go to college. 0 However, the
right to travel has not yet been extended so far as to protect
against the type of infringement which nonresident tuition creates. Nonresident tuition deters students who wish to travel to
66. See text accompanying note 76 infra; Note, Residence Requirements After Shapiro v. Thompson, 70 CoLum L. REv. 134, 153-55 (1970).
67. Section 2 (h) of the proposed residence regulations for the University of Minnesota provides:
A minor whose parents were residents of the state for at least
one year immediately prior to his restration but lost residence by leaving the state after he registered may retain residence privileges for one calendar year after their departure, or,
where the parents were residents of the state continuously for at
least five years immediately prior to his registration, he may
retain residence privileges for two successive calendar years after their departure, or, where the parents were residents of the
state continuously for at least ten successive calendar years
immediately prior to his registration, he may retain residence
privileges for three successive calendar years after their departure, providing in each case that he remains in substantially
continuous registration and makes satisfactory progress.
68. See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa
1966).
69. See text accompanying notes 13-21 supra.
70. Note, supra note 66, at 152-53.
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another state for a time (e.g., four years) but who do not wish to
change their residence from their original home state. In its
broadest extension to date, the right to travel interstate has been
used to protect the right of persons to government benefits in the
states to which they migrate, that is, in the states in which they
take up residence. 71 Before nonresident tuition could be struck
down, the right to travel would have to be extended one step further to protect the rights of persons to government benefits in
any state to which the person travels.
2. PercentageLimitations on Nonresidents
Besides imposing nonresident tuition, some states make an
additional resident-nonresident distinction by limiting the percentage of the student body that may consist of nonresidents. 72
The states defend such limits on the ground that their educational facilities are limited and that they have a duty to serve
73
residents first.

A limit on the percentage of nonresidents in the student body
is a more substantial burden on travel than nonresident tuition.
Nonresident tuition merely makes the student's sojourn in another state more expensive, or at worst limits such travel to
wealthy students. The percentage limitation, however, could
completely frustrate the desire of many students, both rich and
poor, to go to college in another state.
A percentage limitation on nonresidents would probably not
be held to infringe on the right to travel because, like nonresident tuition, it does not deter anyone from changing his residence. 74 However, if the percentage limitation were found to
penalize the right to travel, it is doubtful that it could pass judgment under the compelling interest test.
The state's purpose of ensuring that all qualified citizens of
the state will have a chance to attend the state university will not
satisfy the compelling interest test if there are other ways to
achieve the goal without penalizing the right to travel. 73 In this
case there is such an alternative. The state could raise nonresident tuition until it was equal to the total cost of educating the
71. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Note, Shapiro v.
Thompson: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 989,
1012 (1969).

72. See, e.g., Nzw HAmPs=EREv. STAT. ANN. §§ 187:29-31 (Supp.
1970); N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 32, col. 2.
73. N.Y. Times, supra note 72.
74. See text accompanying notes 55 and 71 supra.
75. Cf. Note, supra note 65, at 1122.
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student. The tuition increase would solve the problem in two
ways. First, with the tuition higher fewer nonresidents would
come to the school, thus creating more room for residents. More
importantly, with nonresidents completely paying their own
way, they would not be an important factor in the state's decision
on how much money it should spend on education. The state
could spend whatever amount it wished to educate its citizens
and could accommodate nonresidents at the same time.
Furthermore, by limiting the number of nonresidents to a
small percentage of the student body, the state has made a choice
to subsidize the education of many residents and only a few nonresidents. This is not the only rational alternative available to
the state. The reason usually advanced for subsidizing residents rather than nonresidents is that residents are more likely
than nonresidents to remain in the state after they get out of
school and use their education to make a contribution to the
state's economy and future.76 However, when the state puts a
percentage limitation on the number of nonresidents in the student body, it is favoring the admission of less qualified residents
over more highly qualified nonresidents. The state could just as
rationally base admission purely on academic merit on the theory
that the contribution of those few highly qualified nonresidents
who elect to stay in the state will be greater than the contribution of the less qualified residents whom the nonresidents displaced in the student body.7 7

3. Improper State Purpose
In the preceding discussion it has been assumed that the
state's only reason for limiting the number of nonresident students was to enable the state to educate its own citizens. It is
possible, however, that percentage limitations on nonresidents in
the student body, as well as increases in nonresident tuition, are
enacted for other reasons. Where the state legislators believe
that campus disruptions are caused mainly by nonresidents, they
may try to restore tranquility by establishing percentage limitations or raising tuition to keep nonresidents out of the university.78 Clearly such an attempt to keep many nonresidents out of
the state university because some of them are troublemakers is
an impermissible burden on the right to travel. It falls directly
76. See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78
Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
77. See Note, supra note 66, at 154-55.
78. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1969, at 32, col. 2.
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79
within the language of Edwards v. California:
There are [boundaries on the permissible area of state legislative activity]. And none is more certain than the prohibition
against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself
from difficulties common to all of them by restraining the
transportation of persons and property across its borders. It is
frequently the case that a State might gain a momentary respite from the pressure of events by the simple expedient of
shutting its gates to the outside world.80
Since right to travel cases are decided by a balancing process, 8 ' the presence of an improper motive, even though the statute advances an otherwise legitimate state interest, should tip
the balance against the statute. However, overturning a statute
on the basis of the motive behind it does raise some problems.
There is a long-standing principle of constitutional law, first announced by Chief Justice Marshall, that courts will not examine
the motives of legislators in determining the validity of a statute.8 2 This principle is based partly on the fact that a group of
legislators seldom shares a single motive for passing a bill, and
partly on the judiciary's respect for the integrity of the legislature as a co-equal branch of government.8 3
The movement away from judicial restraint, especially in the
areas of race and personal rights, has eroded somewhat the doctrine that courts will not examine legislative motives when considering the constitutionality of a statute.84 Also, the doctrine
may have less force when a federal court is reviewing the act of
a state legislature, since state legislatures are not co-equal
branches of government with the federal judiciary, in the sense
s5
that the Congress is.

In Griffin v. County School Board,8 the Supreme Court
looked behind a discriminatory state statute and decided that racial discrimination was the motivating purpose.8 7 The right to
travel interstate, like the right to be free from racial discrimination, is a fundamental constitutional right.8 8 Therefore, it is difficult to see why the Court should be less willing to look through
79. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
80. Id. at 173.
81. See text accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
82. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130 (1810); Note,
supra note 65, at 1092-94.
83. Note, supra note 65, at 1092-94.
84. Cf. id. at 1080.
85. Cf. id. at 1093 n.101.
86. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
87. Id. at 231; cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).

88. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30,634 (1969).
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a nonresident tuition statute to see whether its underlying purpose was to restrain nonresident students from traveling into
the state.s9
B. THE WAITING-PERIOD

REQUIREMENT

The most controversial aspect of nonresident tuition is the
waiting-period requirement, i.e., the rule that extends resident
tuition status only to those who have been residents of the state
for a given period of time. The landmark Supreme Court decision in Shapiro v. Thompson90 has in particular inspired attacks
on the tuition waiting-period. Shapiro concerned state and District of Columbia regulations denying welfare assistance to any
resident who had not been a resident of the state or district for at
least one year prior to his application for assistance. The Court
held that the regulations penalized new residents for exercising
their constitutional right to travel, and that since the waitingperiod did not advance a compelling state interest, the regulations were unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.,'
The tuition waiting-period has always been upheld in court
as a reasonable state regulation. 2 Since the Shapiro decision,
two courts have expressly rejected the argument that, in light of
Shapiro, the tuition waiting-period imposes an unconstitutional
burden on interstate travel.9 3 Both cases noted several distinctions between the tuition and welfare waiting-periods.
1. Distinctions between Welfare and Tuition Waiting-Periods
a. The Disadvantage Imposed on Travelers
The Shapiro Court expressly limited its decision of unconstitutionality to the welfare waiting-period. In a footnote to its
opinion, the Court said that state-imposed waiting-periods for
other purposes, including resident tuition, may be valid if they
89. Cf. Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. Rzv. 567, 577
(1966).
90. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
91. Id. at 634-38.
92. See Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26
(D. imi. Sept. 22, 1970), affd merm, 91 S. Ct. 1231 (1971); Kirk v.
Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App.
1969); Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 188 CaL. 559, 205 P. 1071
(1922); Landwehr v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 156 Colo. 1, 396 P.2d 451
(1964).
93. See Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26, at 6
(D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), affd imem., 91 S. Ct. 1231 (1971); Kirk
v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
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either promote compelling state interests or are not penalties
upon the exercise of the right of interstate travel 4 In Kirk
v. Board of Regents,95 the first case after Shapiro to uphold
the tuition waiting-period, the court quoted this footnote from
Shapiro and proceeded to apply the traditional "rational basis"
standard9" to the tuition waiting-period. 97 Apparently, therefore, the Kirk court upheld the waiting-period on the ground
that it was not a penalty upon the exercise of the right of interstate travel.
There are good reasons for holding that the tuition waitingperiod does not penalize interstate travel. By denying benefits
or privileges to newly arrived citizens until they have resided in
the state for a prescribed period of time, all residence requirements do burden the right to travel to some extent.9 8 However,
the Shapiro opinion clearly indicated that not all burdens on
travel will be considered "penalties."9 9
Cases in which welfare waiting-periods have been struck
down have emphasized the severe burden these requirements
place on the new resident-the denial of the means to obtain such
necessities as food and lodging. 100 Although the waiting-period
for tuition purposes does harm the traveler, the loss is different
from that caused by the welfare waiting-period. First of all, the
tuition waiting-period involves the benefits of higher education.
A citizen's interest in higher education may be great, but it is
clearly not as important as the requirements of food and shelter,
which are affected by the welfare waiting-period. 10 Furthermore, the welfare waiting-period causes the new resident to be
completely deprived of state welfare assistance; in the case of the
tuition waiting-period, the benefit of state education is still available to the new resident, but at a higher price. 102 Based on
the difference in harm, the courts have found the tuition waitingperiod less likely than the welfare waiting-period to deter a
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
note 65,
100.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969).

273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
See text accompanying note 10 supra.
273 Cal. App. 2d at 441, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
Note, supra note 71, at 1001.
See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra. See also Note, supra
at 1130.
See, e.g., Shapiro v.'Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969); Green

v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173, 178 (D. Del. 1961).
101. See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 440, 78
Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

102. Id.
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person from changing his residence.1 03 In fact, the Kirk court
specifically decided that the tuition waiting-period did not deter
an appreciable number of people from moving into California
and cited the ever-increasing population of the state in support
of its conclusion. 104
The difference in harm may justify a finding that the burden created by the tuition waiting-period is not enough to constitute a penalty, but the Kirk court's finding that it has no chilling
effect is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it is difficult to see
how the increasing population of the state proves that the tuition waiting-period does not have a chilling effect on interstate
travel. The population statistic only indicates how many people
came to the state, not how many would have come but for the
waiting-period requirement. Second, since the impact of the
tuition waiting-period falls to a large extent on a limited group,
namely students, evidence of the interstate movement of that
group, rather than the general population, would be more appro05
priate.
b. Difference in Purpose for the Waiting-Periods
i

Purpose of the Welfare Waiting-Period

The.courts have also distinguished between the welfare and
tuition waiting-periods on the basis of the different purposes for
which they are used by the state. One of the reasons the Supreme Court struck down the welfare waiting-period was that
the state purposes behind it were improper. In Shapiro the
states conceded that the primary purpose for the welfare waitingperiod was to deter the immigration of indigents who, the states
feared, would become continuing burdens on the state relief
rolls.'0 6 The Court expressly stated that the purpose of inhibiting migration by needy persons into the state is constitutionally
impermissible. 107
'
The states also argued in Shapiro that the
waiting-period could be sustained as an attempt to distinguish
between new and old residents on the basis of their tax contribu103. Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26, at 7 (D.
MinL Sept. 22, 1970), affd mem., 91 S.Ct. 1233 (1971); Kirk v. Board
of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67 (Dist Ct.
App. 1969).
104. See 273 Cal. App. 2d at 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
105. See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw---Residence Requirements for
Titition Purposes Held Not Violative of Equal Protection, 38 Form. L.
REv.338, 343 n.51 (1969).

106. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-28 (1969).
-107. Id, at 629.
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tion to the state.'08 The Court found this purpose impermissible
also. The Court said that the equal protection clause prohibits
the state form allocating benefits or services among its citizens
on the basis of their tax contribution. 10 9
ii.

Purpose of the Tuition Waiting-Period

Unlike the welfare waiting-period, the tuition waiting-period
does not have the specific objective of excluding people from the
state.1 0 The courts have upheld the tuition waiting-period on
the basis of two other purposes which it serves: cost equalization and proof of domiciliary intent."' In the recent cases the
courts have viewed cost equalization as the primary purpose for
the tuition waiting-period. 1 2 This emphasis on cost equalization
is unfortunate, because, in light of Shapiro, use of a waitingperiod for cost equalization is impermissible.
The cost equalization rationale was fully articulated in Kirk
v. Board of Regents." 3 Starns v. Malkerson, 4 the other recent
case on the tuition waiting-period, merely followed Kirk." 5 In
Kirk the court said that the state could reasonably charge lower
tuition to those who had contributed to the state, through taxes
or otherwise, by living in the state for a year. Implicitly, then,
the court said that the state could charge higher tuition to residents who had not lived in the state for a year. In reaching this
conclusion the Kirk court apparently confused the classification
caused by the waiting-period with the resident-nonresident distinction and clearly misread Shapiro.
Although cost equalization has been held a proper purpose
for distinguishing between resident and nonresident students,"10
108.
109.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 632-33.

110. See Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26, at 6
(D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), aff'd mem., 91 S. Ct. 1233 (1971).
111. See Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26, at
11-12 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), aff'd mem., 91 S. Ct. 1233 (1971); Kirk v.
Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1969); /Bryan v. Regents of Calif., 188 Cal. 559, 561-62, 205
P. 1071, 1071-72 (1922).

112. See Starns v. Malkerson, -

F. Supp.

-,

No. 4-70 Civ. 26, at

11-12 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), affdmem., 91 S. Ct. 1233 (1971); Kirk v.
Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).

113.

273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

114. - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), afl'd
mem., 91 S. Ct. 1233 (1971).

115. Id. at 11-12.
116. See Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 883 (8th Cir. 1969); Clarke
v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Kirk v. Board of Re-
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it is not a proper purpose for distinguishing, as the waiting-period does, between residents for more than a year and residents
for less than a year, since in this classification both classes are
composed of citizens of the state. Shapiro clearly forbids the
state from allocating services among its citizens on the basis of
their higher tax contribution. 17 The allocation involved by
charging one class of residents more than another class to attend
the state university surely should fall within this proscription.
The Kirk court apparently thought that the prohibition in
Shapiro only applied to cases involving benefits essential to life
and health, such as welfare, and not to less pressing needs.11 8
However, the Shapiro Court made no such statement in its opinion. Furthermore, in stating the rule the Shapiro Court offered
schools, parks and libraries as examples of benefits which the
state could not allocate among its residents on the basis of their
tax contribution. 1 19
The other purpose which the courts have recognized-proof
of intent to be domiciled in the state 2 0 -offers the best justification for the tuition waiting-period. The tuition waiting-period
and the welfare waiting-period are used to deal with different
problems. In the welfare context there is little doubt that the
indigents upon whom the waiting-period is imposed are bona fide
residents of the state.' 2 ' The state's concern is that they are economically undesirable residents, since they are likely to be a continuing burden on the state's relief rolls and are unlikely to make
a significant economic contribution to the state. Therefore the
state seeks to exclude them by imposing a waiting-period.
The purpose of the tuition waiting-period, however, is not to
exclude undesirable residents from the state. New residents who
take advantage of state-supported higher education are desirable
to the state since they will probably make significant contributions to the community and, in particular, will earn enough income over the years to pay back to the state through taxes the
costs of their education. The concern of the state in this area is
to make sure that the people to whom it grants resident tuition
status are bona fide residents who are likely to remain in the state
gents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist Ct. App.
1969).
117. See 394 U.S. at 632-33.
118. See 273 Cal. App. 2d at 444, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
119. 394 U.S. at 632.
120. Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 444, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 269 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
188 Cal. 559, 561-62, 205 P. 1071, 1072 (1922).
121. See Note, supra note 71, at 1012.
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and not people who are in the state merely to get an education
and who will then leave without having made any contribution to
the local community. 122 The tuition waiting-period attempts to
discourage such people from seeking residence classification.
In Shapiro, the Court found that "the residence requirement
and the one-year waiting-period requirement are distinct and independent prerequisites for assistance . . . , and the facts relevant to the determination of each are directly examined by the
welfare authorities.' 1 23 However, in the resident tuition context, the waiting-period is not distinct and independent from the
residence requirement.
To be domiciled in a state, one must have a bona fide intent
to make that state his home. 124 In the case of a student, the requisite intent is often very difficult to prove.1 25 During the years
when a student is attending college, his plans for future residence are usually vague and uncertain. Also, little reliance can
be placed on any statement of intent by the student, since the
student knows that he will realize a substantial reduction in tuition by being classified as a resident. 126 The courts, therefore,
allow the states to require a student to reside in the state for one
year, as evidence of his bona fide intent to remain permanently,
before according him resident tuition status. 127 In effect, the
waiting-period creates a third status beside "resident" and "nonresident." The student to whom the waiting-period applies could
be considered a "provisional resident for tuition purposes" who
will receive complete resident status by living in the state for a
28
year and thus proving his intent to be domiciled there.
2.

The Waiting-Periodas a Rebuttable Presumption

The largest criticism of the tuition waiting-period as a device
for proving domiciliary intent is that its burden falls too often
on people whose intent is not seriously doubted. While the waiting-period is aimed at discouraging students from seeking resident status when they do not really intend to become residents,
too often it works a hardship by denying a student who is clearly
122.
123.

Id.
394 U.S. at 636.

124. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
125. Spencer, The Legal Aspects of the Nonresident Tuition Fee,
6 OR& L. REV. 332, 334 (1926).
126. Id. at 352-53.
127. See Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 260 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Bryan v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 188
Cal. 559, 205 P. 1071 (1922). See also Spencer, supra note 125, at 334.
128. Cf. Comment, Residency, Tuition, and the Twelve-Month Dilemma, 7 HousToN L. REv. 241, 245 (1969).
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a permanent resident benefits given to other residents.1 2 Such
hardship could be avoided if the waiting-period requirement
could be waived in cases where the student presented unusually
convincing evidence of domiciliary intent. 18 0 This practice would
not weaken the state policy that the domiciliary intent of students must be clearly shown. Not only would it be fairer to apply
the tuition waiting-period flexibly, it may be that the law re-

quires it to be applied in such a manner. In Green v. Department
3
of Public Welfare,'1
where the constitutionality of a welfare
waiting-period was challenged, it was argued that a valid purpose
for-the waiting-period was to provide an objective test for determining the "intention!' aspect of domicile. The court declared
this purpose unreasonable since, under the circumstances involved, there were more accurate alternatives available to ascertain
an individual's true intention. 132 The court also emphasized the
dire economic consequences of the welfare waiting-period133

The personal interests involved in a welfare case are more
basic and immediate than those in a resident tuition case, and
proof of intent to remain may be more difficult in a tuition case;
nevertheless, the Green court's objection to the welfare waitingperiod is equally applicable to the tuition waiting-period. The
state should not be allowed to impose the waiting-period in cases
where the student can present
convincing evidence that he in134
tends to remain in the state.
Certainly, flexible use of the waiting-period would
be favored
by the courts if the tuition waiting-period was ever judged under the "compelling interest" standard of equal protection. Under that standard the court may require the state to use a less
onerous alternative which impairs the fundamental interest as
infrequently as possible.1sr Selective use of the waiting-period
would be less onerous than the across-the-board application of
the waiting-period which now is the case.
129. Spencer, supra note 125, at 334-35. See, e.g., Starns v. Malkerson, -F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), affd mem.,
91 S. Ct.- 1233 (1971).
130. In-effect there would be a rebuttable presumption that the student is actually a nonresident during the first year in which he
claims'to be a resident. The presumption could be overcome only by
clear and convincing evidence of domiciliary intent
131. 270 F. Supp. 173 (D.Del. 1967).
132. Id. at 177-78.
133. Id.
134. But see Starns v. Malkerson, - F. Supp. -, No. 4-70 Civ. 26,
at 9-10 (D. Minn. Sept. 22, 1970), affd mem., 91 S.Ct. 1233 (1971).
135. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HAnv. L. REV. 1065, 1122 (1969).
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN RFECLASSIFICATION
Besides initially classifying students as residents or nonresidents, university officials are often called upon to reclassify students. Frequently, students who were initially classified as nonresidents claim to have acquired domicile during their stay at the
university and ask to be reclassified as residents.180 The universities do not apply their reclassification procedures liberally,
however, because the prospect of lower tuition can induce students to make unfounded claims, and it is difficult, due to the
problems involved in proving "intent,"' 8 7 to distinguish legitimate
claims for reclassification from unfounded ones.
Constitutional guarantees of equal protection, whether state
or federal, limit the state's power to deny reclassification. In the
past, some states adopted the rule that the initial classification
was permanent-that is, a student originally classified as a nonresident retained that classification throughout continuous attendance at the university. In Newman v. Graham'8 such a rule
was declared invalid for being arbitrary and unreasonable.1 0
The court's objection to the rule was that it denied a student
classified as a nonresident any opportunity to show a change of
domiciliary status. 40 The court emphasized that it was the denial of any opportunity to be heard on the matter which was ob141
jectionable.
The United States Supreme Court has also ruled that under
the equal protection clause states must give persons classified as
nonresidents the opportunity to show that they have become residents. In Carringtonv. Rash, 42 the Court declared unconstitutional a section of the Texas constitution which prohibited any
member of the armed forces of the United States who moved his
home to Texas during the course of his military duty from acquiring Texas residence for voting purposes so long as he remained a member of the armed forces. The Court stressed the
fact that Texas had a right to require that its voters be residents, but said that by forbidding a serviceman any opportunity
to controvert the presumption of nonresidence, the state imposed
136. See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Newman v. Graham, 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960); Spencer, supra note
125, at 344.
137. Spencer, supra note 125, at 354.
138. 82 Idaho 90, 349 P.2d 716 (1960).
139. Id. at 95, 349 P.2d at 719.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142. 380 U.S. 89, 93-94, 96 (1965).
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an invidious discrimination in violation of the fourteenth amend143
ment.
Most states do not prohibit a nonresident from being reclassified, but instead apply a presumption that a nonresident enrolled in a full-time course of instruction at any school in the
state is in the state primarily for educational purposes, and will
44
not be considered to have established a residence in the state.
This presumption is interpreted by the courts as being rebuttable
upon proper proof by the student, so the constitutional objections raised in Newman and Carringtonare avoided.145 A rebuttable presumption of nonresidence seems to be the proper way of
reconciling the large majority of cases, in which a student from
another state does not intend to remain after he is graduated,
with those cases where the student could prove, if given an op14
portunity to be heard, that he does intend to remain. 0
V. CONCLUSION
Nonresident tuition originated as an economy measure demanded by taxpayers who objected to giving inexpensive educa1 47
tion to outsiders who had not contributed to its availability.
The resident-nonresident classification is constitutional, both as
to the reasonableness of the classification and the legitimacy of
the state object of cost equalization.
There is, however, a danger that the state will use its power
to discriminate against nonresidents for improper purposes.
The courts should not hesitate to act in circumstances where it is
clear that a nonresident tuition increase or enactment of a percentage limitation on nonresidents was passed for the improper
purpose of restraining travel by nonresidents rather than for legitimate purposes.
143. Id. at 96-97.
144. See, e.g., Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 122 (S.D. Iowa
1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 36.16(3) (1966); UvnivEsrry oF MummoT
RE iDNcE REGULATIONS

2 (c).

145. See Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117, 122 (S.D. Iowa 1966);
Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268-69
(Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Comment, supra note 105, at 343 n.47.
Despite the Newman and Carrington decisions, some states still
have residence regulations which, on their face, clearly adopt an incontrovertable presumption of nonresidency. See CoLO. REv. SiTA. ANN.
§ 124-18-3 (3) (Supp. 1967); UNvER=ST oF MIC~GAN REsMENCE RmuLATIONS 2. Literal application of such regulations would be contrary to

Newman and to the spirit of Carrington.
146.

See Spencer, supra note 125, at 354.

147. Id. at 332.
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Although it is not clear that the waiting-period is the best
means of determining domiciliary intent, it is a reasonable
method and is constitutional. The Shapiro decision does not
control the tuition waiting-period issue for two reasons. First,
the harm caused by the welfare waiting-period is much more
serious than the harm caused by the tuition waiting-period. Secondly, the purpose of the welfare waiting-period-exclusion of
indigents-was impermissible, whereas the purpose of the tuition
waiting-period is proper. Although the courts have erroneously
emphasized the improper purpose of cost equalization, the proper
purpose for the tuition waiting-period is proof of domiciliary
intent. In matters of reclassification the rebuttable presumption
of nonresidence seems to be the best way of reconciling the great
majority of cases with the constitutional requirement that the
student always be given the opportunity to show that he has
become a resident.
The greatest need in administering resident tuition policy is
the development of flexible procedures both in the basic resident-nonresident classification and in the application of the waiting-period. The domicile of a student is often very difficult to determine, since the period of college attendance coincides with a
time when a person's future plans are usually unsettled. This
difficulty, together with the fact that any statements by students on the issue are self-serving and of dubious credibility,
justifies strict application of residence requirements. However,
strict requirements do not preclude flexibility, and the states
have no legitimate reason to deny or to postpone resident tuition
status to a person who has presented convincing proof of his intention to remain in the state.

